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Potter: Potter: Is Alternative Dispute Resolution a Possibility in the Riverboat Gambling Quagmire

NOTES
Is Alternative Dispute Resolution a
Possibility in the Riverboat
Gambling Quagmire?
Akin v. Missouri Gaming Commission'

I. INTRODUCTION
....Flo, I'd like to be The Greek.' And I said, "I'm sorry, Nick, you're not Greek.
And under New York State gambling laws it's forbidden." 2 -Woody AllenDuring the 1990s, the emergence of riverboat gambling operations has led to
an avalanche of social and political debates.' Since 1989, riverboat gaming has been
electorally approved in several midwestern states, including Iowa, Illinois, Indiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, and Louisiana.4 However, this voter acceptance of a formerly
stigmatized industry has not come without a significant backlash. In particular,
religious groups have denounced riverboat gambling, claiming that such activity
inevitably leads to, inter alia, dissipated savings, chronic addictions, and other
ancillary societal vices, including prostitution, alcoholism, and drug abuse.'
Such emotive responses had not come without a response from the courts. The
issue of riverboat gambling in Missouri was argued before the Supreme Court of
Missouri twice; 6 such arguments had raised the possibility that at least five riverboat
casinos were in violation of the Missouri Constitution.
The issue has since been resolved. In November of 1998, Missouri voters
approved a constitutional amendment that retroactively legalized games of chance
aboard gambling casinos that operate from off-river, man-made moats.' This may
have overturned and rendered moot Akin; however, the issues of alternative dispute
resolution that were raised by the gambling battles are still ripe for study and
analysis.

1. 956 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
2. WOODY ALLEN, WITHOUT FEATHERS 214 (1972).
3. Daniel T. Murphy & Jack M. Epps, Riverboat Gaming Development in Missouri, 53 J. MO. B. 15,
15 (1997).
4. Id.
5. See James C. Fitzpatrick, Clergy Decry Casinos, KANSAS CITY STAR, Mar. 29, 1994, at BI.

6. See Akin, 956 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1997) (en bane); Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d
58 (Mo. 1994).
7. Virginia Young, "Boats in Moats" Win Round In Court Fight, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30,
1998, at Al.
8. Rick Aim, Casino Boats in Moats Survive: Missouri Test Issue Wins Locally By a Landslide,
KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 4, 1998, at Al.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING

On election day, 1994, the people of Missouri voted on a new constitutional
amendment. 9 The question to which 1,751,459 voters responded was:
Shall the General Assembly be authorized to permit only upon the
Mississippi River and the Missouri River lotteries, gift enterprises, and
games of chance to be conducted on excursion gambling boats and floating
facilities? This proposal would increase state revenues from existing
gaming boats approximately $30,000,000 per year. Impact on local
governments is unknown."
The ballot passed by a fifty-four to forty six percent margin," giving the
Missouri Constitution a new amendment, Article III, section 39(e).' 2 The amendment
specifically reads "The General Assembly is authorized to permit only upon the
Mississippi River and the Missouri River lotteries, gift enterprises and games of
chance to be conducted on excursion gambling boats and floating facilities."' 3
14
Following the passage of the amendment, the Missouri Gaming Commission,
an entity that has the authority, subject to local voter approval, to determine the
number of gaming licenses and the location and type of each gaming facility,"
issued licenses for the operation of several casinos, including the Riverport Casino
Center in Maryland Heights and the Station Casino Kansas City.' These casinos
were structurally different from other existing Missouri casinos such as the President
Casino and the Casino Queen located in downtown St. Louis and East St. Louis,
respectively. The new breed of casinos were built in man-made basins, i.e."moats,"
off the flow of the river, that were created for the sole purpose of holding the
casinos.' 7 Following a model used in the gambling town of Tunica, Mississippi, these
casinos were built on barges, not boats.'" Furthermore, the architecture of these new

9. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 263.

10. Id.
11. Paul E. Parker, Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto: Gambling, Taxes, the Court, and Citizen
Amendments in Missouri, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1675, 1678 (1996) (citing James C. Fitzpatrick & Bill
Graham, "'OneArmed Bandits "Grab Powerful Wave of Support, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 9, 1994, at
Al).
12. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 263.
13. MO. CONST. of 1945, art III, § 39(e) (1994).
14. Created by MO. REV. STAT. § 313.004 (1994). The commission consists of five members who
meet quarterly. The members may not be elected officials, rather they are appointed by the governor. The
members are appointed for three year terms, their tenure not to exceed six years. An action by the
committee is binding only if the action is taken at a meeting where three of the five members are present
and those three vote in favor of the action. Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.004(1) (1994); Murphy & Epps, supra
note 3, at 16.
15. MO. REV. STAT. § 313.812(10) (1994); Murphy & Epps, supra note 3.
16. Fred Faust, School Won't Let Mom Talk About Her Casino Job, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATcH, Feb.

1. 1998, at Al.
17. Young, supra note 7, at Al.
18. Faust, supra note 16, at Al.
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casinos was blended with adjoining land-based buildings, so guests would not even
see the water.'9
On August 29, 1996, three plaintiffs, Lycurgus W. Starkey, Susan J. Rix, and
2
W. Todd Akin, a state representative from Town and Country, Missouri, " filed suit
with the Cole County Circuit Court in Missouri against the Missouri Gaming
Commission.2 They alleged, in particular, that the Maryland Heights casinos were
unconstitutional because they were floating in a man-made basin rather than on the
Missouri or Mississippi rivers.22 In particular, they argued the casinos were not
23
contiguous to the river but within 1,000 feet of the main channel. As a result, the
plaintiffs asserted, the casinos were in violation of the Missouri Constitution's
mandate that the riverboats be only "upon the Mississippi River and Missouri
'
River."24
Soon thereafter, the Missouri Gaming Association, the City of Maryland
Heights, and three gaming corporations, including applicants Harrah's Maryland
Heights Corporation and Players Maryland Heights, L.P., intervened on behalf of the
defendant Missouri Gaming Commission.25 The defendants advanced three principal
arguments. First, defendants referred to a 1994 statute, enacted before the
constitutional amendment was adopted, in order to qualify this river/land
distinction.2 6 Chapter 313 dealing with licensed gaming activities, defined the
Mississippi and Missouri Rivers as:
the water, bed, and banks of those rivers, including any space filled by the
water of those rivers for docking purposes in a manner approved by the
commission but shall not include any artificial space created after May 20,
1994, and is located more than 1,000 feet from the closest edge of the
main channel of the river as established by the United States Army Corps.
of Engineers.27
Defendants argued that this statute should be utilized in interpreting the subsequent
amendment.2"
Secondly, the Defendant Missouri Gaming Commission argued that although
the definition may not be patently ambiguous, the General Assembly should be given
free rein to define terms.29 The Missouri Gaming Commission dismissed the
assertion that a word must be ambiguous before the General Assembly can define

19. Id. Hence, the idiom "boat in a moat."
20. Id. Todd Akin is the lead plaintiff in the case. He is a republican representative from the Town

and Country district in St. Louis county. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 262.
§ 39(e) (1996) (emphasis added).
24. MO. CONST. of 1945, art. IllI,
25. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 262.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 263.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.800(1)(16) (1994).
Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 263.
Id. at 264.
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it.30 Moreover, the Defendant Missouri Gaming Association disagreed with the
plaintiffs' definition of the word "on," opting for a broader definition of the word.3
Judge Thomas J. Brown III of the Circuit Court of Cole County upheld the
validity of the statute and dismissed the suit.32 Plaintiffs appealed to the Missouri
Supreme Court under Article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. y The
Missouri Supreme Court subsequently held that the Missouri Constitution did not
authorize riverboat gambling in artificial spaces that were not contiguous, or directly
"on", the Mississippi or Missouri Rivers. 4

Ill. LEGAL HISTORY
A. Recent History of Riverboat Gambling in Missouri
The case history of riverboat gambling in Missouri is an interesting one,
beginning years before the adoption of the Missouri Constitutional amendment in
1994. The November 1994 amendment proposal was the third time in two years that
the issue of riverboat gambling had been placed before Missouri voters.35 This issue
had its inception in the 1992 general elections.3 6 On November 3, 1992, referendum
law House Bill 149 was placed before the voters.37 The ballot title placed before each
voter stated:
Proposition A.--Authorizes riverboat gambling excursions on the
Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, regulated by State Tourism Commission.
Excursions may originate where locally approved by voters. Five hundred
dollar maximum loss limit per person per excursion. The proposal is
intended to produce increased General Revenue."
The people approved this referendum by a 62 percent vote.3 9 According to
experts, by submitting the issue to voters, the legislature circumvented the
constitutional proscription against legislative enactment of lottery games.40 In

30. St. Louis Country Club v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n of Mo., 657 S.W.2d 614,617 (Mo.
1983) (en banc).
31. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 264. Although it is unclear what legal precedent the defendants utilized here,
St. Louis Country Club v. Administrative Hearing Commission of Missouri stated that words standing
alone are to be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, but if a term is specially defined by
statute, the special definition must be given effect. St. Louis Country Club, 657 S.W.2d at 616 (citing
Blue Springs Bowl v. Spradling, 551 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)).
32. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 261-62.
33. Id. at 262.
34. Id. at 264.
35. Parker, supra note 11, at 1675.
36. Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 59.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 60n.l.
39. Parker, supra note 11, at 1676.
40. Id.
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addition, voter approval was gained partially by claims that the referendum's
weaknesses would be amended by the legislature.4
The legislature made good on their assurances. On April 28, 1993, the General
Assembly enacted two statutes, Senate Bills 10 and 11 42 As a practical matter, these
acts repealed almost all of House Bill 149, the referendum motion of the previous
year, yet retained the referendum's spirit.43 The acts, inter alia, created a Gaming
Commission to regulate riverboat gambling, a job previously performed by the
Tourism Commission under the referendum. 44 They also continued special
exemptions from licensing requirements for certain boats and stretches of the
Mississippi riverbank and for certain boats, and allowed all riverboats to be
permanently docked.45 Most importantly, however, the act maintained the
referendum's definition of riverboat gambling games.46 These gambling games
included, but were not limited to, games of skill or games of chance on an excursion
gambling boat.47 Governor Mel Camahan signed the acts on April 29, 1993.48
On April 30, 1993, one day after the Governor approved the act and two days
after the act was passed by the Missouri legislature, Troy Harris, a taxpayer and
registered Missouri voter, filed a petition for declaratory judgment that the acts were
unconstitutional. 49 Harris specifically claimed that the statutes were in violation of,
inter alia, Article III, sections 39(9), 40(28), and 40(30) of the Missouri
Constitution.50 Section 39(9) of the Missouri Constitution stated:
The general assembly shall not have the power ... [e]xcept as otherwise
provided in section 39(b) and section 39(c) of this article, to authorize
lotteries or gift enterprises for any purpose, and shall enact laws to prohibit
the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets 5'
As games of chance, i.e. lotteries, were statutorily allowed on the riverboats, Harris
argued that Senate Bills 10 and 11 were patently unconstitutional.52 After the circuit
court dismissed the suit, Harris appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.53
The court, sitting en banc, first found that the challenged law was clearly an act
of the General Assembly, and thus subject to the limitations of Article III, section

41. Id. Professor Parker also states that there was concern the Missouri tourism commission would
be overwhelmed with such a gigantic responsibility. Id. Apparently, this was the impetus for the
establishment of the Missouri Gaming Commission.
42. Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 59.
43. Id. at 59-60.
44. Id. at 60. The Gaming Commission's duties and responsibilities are codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 313.004 (1994).
45. Id. at 60. Codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.812(3) (1994).
46. Id.
47. Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.800(l)(10) (1994).
48. Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 60.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. MO. CONST. of 1945, art. III, § 39(9) (1994). Keep in mind the chronology: these events took
place before the adoption of 39(e).
52. Harris,869 S.W.2d at 60.
53. Id.
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39(9) . ' The Supreme Court created a gambling taxonomy of three levels: games of
chance, games of skill, and those games whose status had not been ascertained. 5
Those games of chance, including bingo, keno layout, number tickets, pull tabs, jar
tickets, push cards, and punchboards, were found to be "lotteries within the meaning
of Article III, section 39(9), of the Missouri Constitution. ,1 6 As a result, they were
prohibited upon the riverboats.57 Games of skill, not within the prohibitions of
section 39(9), including poker and blackjack, were constitutionally permissible on
the riverboats." Finally, other gambling games, namely slot machines, baccarat,
craps, roulette wheel, klondike table, faro layout, and video games of chance, were
not labeled as either games of chance or games of skill. 9 The court found that these
newer games necessitated an evidentiary hearing as to the elements of skill and
chance.'
6
As the scaffolding of Missouri gaming industry was beginning to collapse, '
rapid action was necessary. Attempting to rescue the upcoming summer tourist
influx, a constitutional amendment was submitted to voters in April, 199462 for the
purpose of legalizing all games of chance and games of skill on Missouri riverboats.
The proponents of riverboat gambling raised over sixty times the funds as their
opponents,. 63 however, the amendment went down in defeat. 64 Games of chance
would not be allowed to operate on Missouri riverboats during the summer of 1994.
After a summer of raising money and petitioning for signatures, gaming
proponents were successful in putting the measure on the ballot for a third time.65 On
November 8, 1994, the people of Missouri adopted the requisite constitutional
amendment that allowed for games of chance and skill to take place on Missouri
riverboats.66

54. Id. Apparently, the Respondents, Missouri Gaming Commission, attempted to argue that Senate
Bills 10 and I I were not "new legislation", rather part of the referendum. The court noted that the

language of the senate bill "explicitly repealed the referendum law... enacted by the General Assembly
and approved by the voters." Thus, Senate bills 10 and I1 were subject to constitutional mandates. See
Parker, supra note 11, at 1676.

55. Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 61-63.
56. Id. at 64; see also Parker, supranote 11, at 1676.
57. Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 64.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Slot machines make up about two-thirds of casinos' revenue. Young, supra, note 7, at Al.
62. Parker, supra note 12, at 1677 (citing Jo Mannies & Kathryn Rogers, Data Show Big Role of KC
Apathy, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 7, 1994, at Al). This amendment was similar to the November

1994 amendment discussed in the facts and holding section.
63. Id. (citing James C. Fitzpatrick, Big Money Flows to Sway Voters on GamblingIssue, KANSAS
CITY STAR, Mar. 30, 1994, at Al). Proponents had raised $3.2 million, while opponents had raised
$45,000. Id.

64. Id. Professor Parker notes the influence of more than a dozen religious leaders representing many
Christian denominations who came out deceivingly against the amendment. Id. (citing James C.
Fitzpatrick, Clergy Decry Casinos, KANSAS CITY STAR, Mar. 29, 1994, at BI).
65. Id. at 1678.
66. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 263; see also, supra text accompanying notes 12, 23.
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B. The Trend of Missouri Courts toward a "PlainMeaning"
Method of Statutory Interpretation.
As Justice Holmes taught, the ordinary meaning of statutory language is the
common understanding of what the "rle of law" is. 67 The plain meaning
interpretation of legislative action is best summed up by the expression that
"[c]itizens ought to be able to open up the statute books and find out what the law
requires of them."6
In Akin, the Missouri Supreme Court relied upon the principles of Missouri law
which emphasize plain meaning interpretations of the Missouri Constitution. The
court adhered to the tenet that "every word employed in the constitution is to be
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common-sense meaning,
unless the context
69
furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it."
Missouri case law is equivocal in its approach to interpreting the state
constitution and legislation using the plain meaning approach. Some decisions have
stated that the ordinary, usual meaning of words is to be utilized, and said usual
meaning normally appears in the dictionary.70 Indeed, influential weight shall be
given to official legislative and executive acts, and such acts are "very persuasive on
the courts." However, such weight is "held persuasive only when the section in
question is ambiguous and its meaning doubtful."'l The courts have often stressed
an objective, lay-person approach to its ancillary department's procurements, as they
did in Zahner. In Zahner, it insisted that it "must undertake to ascribe to the words
the meaning
the people understood the words to have when they adopted the
72
provision.,
Nevertheless, other decisions have been less confident of such a plain meaning
philosophy. In Boone County Court v. Missouri,73 the court stated that "[r]ules
applicable to constitutional construction are the same as those applied to statutory
construction, except that the former are given a broader construction, due to their
more permanent character., 74 Such a statement seems at direct odds with the
interpretative theories utilized in Dalton and Zahner. Yet, the court again utilized
this reasoning a year later, when it explained, in St. Louis Country Club v.
AdministrativeHearing Commission of Missouri,7" that if a term is specially defined
by statute, the special defimition must be given effect. 76 Needless to say, Missouri
courts have been less than clear on utilizing a uniform philosophy for statutory
interpretation.

67. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
68. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 564 (2d

ed. 1995).
69. State, ex inf. Dalton v. Dearing, 263 S.W.2d 381, 385 (1954).
70. Zahner v. City of Perryville, 813 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Mo. 1991) (en bane).
71. State ex rel. Randolph County v. Walden, 206 S.W.2d 979, 984 (1947).
72. Zahner, 813 S.W.2d at 858.
73. 631 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
74. Id. at 324.
75. 657 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
76. Id. at 617. In defense of a plain meaning interpretation of the Missouri constitution, the above
statement was made in reply to a statutory interpretation issue rather than a constitutional interpretation
issue.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1998, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 5
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1998, No. 2

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Akin, the Missouri Supreme Court applied a plain meaning interpretation to
amendment 39(e) to the exclusion of all other theories of statutory interpretation.77
After a brief history of amendment 39(e) and the ballot title from which it was
adopted,78 the court emphasized that the meaning of the phrase "only upon the
Mississippi River and the Missouri River" was key to this case.79
The Akin court wasted no time in designating the standards they would be using
to interpret the meaning of the words "upon" and "only." In determining the
meaning of a constitutional provision, the court first undertook to ascribe to the
words the meaning that the people understood them to have when the provision was
adopted.'0 The only way to accomplish this was to reflect the common sense of the
people and expound every word in its "plain, obvious, and common-sense
meaning.""
Relying on the Zahner decision, the court then looked to the dictionary to
ascertain the "plain, obvious, and common-sense meaning" of the words "upon" and
"only." 2 Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "only" as
"exclusively, solely., 83 "Upon" is defined as "on," which is "used as a function
word to indicate position over and in contact with that which supports from
beneath." ' Finally, the court uses Webster's definition of "river," as "a natural
surface stream of water of considerable volume and permanent or seasonal flow." 5
Based upon these denotations, the court concluded that "[b]y approving the
1994 constitutional amendment, the people intended that games of chance be
conducted on facilities that are solely over and in contact with the surface of the
Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. 8 16 As a result, any casinos located in man-made
moats or artificial spaces that are not contiguous to the surface stream of the river,
87
thus being land based, were in violation of the Missouri Constitution.
Nevertheless, gambling may occur in artificial spaces that are contiguous to the
surface stream, thus being river based.88
Throughout their discussion, the court dismissed pleas by the defendants to rely
upon the Boone County and St. Louis Country Club precedents, that allow for
broader statutory interpretation in determining the connotations of constitutional and
statutory words and phrases.8 9 Defendants claimed that section 313.800.1(16),
broadly defining the "Missouri River" and the "Mississippi River," should be given

77. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 263.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Boone County Court, 631 S.W.2d at 324.

81. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 263 (citing Dalton, 263 S.W.2d at 385).
82. Id. (citing Zahner,813 S.W.2d at 858 ("This ordinary and usual meaning normally appears in the
dictionary.")).
83. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1577 (1976)).
84. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S at 2517, 1574).
85. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S at 1962).

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 264.
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weight because it was intact before the constitutional amendment was adopted.
However, this argument was easily dismissed by the court. 90 The court decreed that
to the extent section 313.800.1(16) conflicts with the Missouri Constitution, it is
invalid. 9' Defendants then asserted that statutory language could be utilized to define
a constitutional term even in the absence of ambiguity. 92 The court disposed of this
theory by relying on State ex rel. Randolph County v. Walden. 93 The court stated
that the legislature had no authority to vary the meaning of unambiguous terms in
the Constitution. 94 Since the terms in the constitutional amendment were
unambiguous and easily definable by consultation with a dictionary, neither the
legislature, nor any other entity, could redefine their meaning. 95
In an effort to salvage their case and utilize a plain meaning argument,
defendants attempted to opt for a broader definition of the word "upon" in the
interpretation of the amendment. Defendants Missouri Gaming Association stressed
a different dictionary definition of the word "on," namely "a location closely
adjoining something (a town situated on the river) or location very near some point
of a narrowly extended area (as a street) (lives on the principal street of the town)." 96
The court was not convinced; they merely dismissed this definition as part of a more
general definition that "on" is "used as a function word to indicate contiguity or
dependence." ' The sub-definition cited by the Association did not have a different
meaning than the general definition of "on," because a facility is "over and in contact
with" the river if it is in an artificial space, filled with river water, that touches the
surface stream for considerable distances.98 Since this case was dismissed before any
evidence could be heard, the cause was reversed and remanded for proceedings
consistent with the court's opinion. 99

V. COMMENT
A. An Introduction
Immediately upon the handing down of this decision, legal, business, and
societal confusion erupted. Missouri Attomey General Jay Nixon stated that "some
[casinos] will have to move or be moved. If you operate games of chance in an area
not allowed by the constitution, that is a crime."' ° The decision threatened the
future of St. Louis' Riverport Casino Center and two Kansas City projects possessing
a combined investment of $720 million.'0 ' Although Akin was remanded to the trial
90. Id. at263.
91. Idat 264.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. Defendants cited St. Louis Country Club, 657 S.W.2d at 617 for support.
206 S.W.2d 979, 984 (1947).
Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 264.
Id.
96. Id. at 264 (citing WEBSTER'S at 1574).
97. Akin, 956 S.W.2d at 264 (citing WEBSTER'S at 1574).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 265.
100. Faust supra note 16, at A].
101. Id.
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court, immediate issues developed concerning whether the casino companies would
have grounds to sue the state.'0 2 The casinos' plans had been continuously and
systematically approved vis a vis the state regulatory commissions, including the
Missouri Gaming Commission, every step of the way.' 03 Licenses, upon which the
casino companies relied, were granted by the state of Missouri; the Missouri
Supreme Court was now declaring them unconstitutional.' 4
During this period of adjudication, the Missouri Gaming Commission had
developed state procedures for disciplining riverboat casinos who were alleged to be
in violation of state law.'0 5 On January 29, 1998, however, Cole County Circuit
Judge Byron Kinder ruled that the gaming commission's disciplinary process was
backwards." Casinos had been required to prove their innocence before regulators
presented evidence of wrongdoing, a patent violation of both Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process and the Missouri Constitution.'0 7
Additionally, there existed the problem of increased revenue flow if several
integral casinos should be forced to close. Casinos argued that the gaming industry
has become an integral part of Missouri's economy. 0 8 Casino licensees were being
taxed at the rate of twenty percent on all adjusted gross receipts from gambling
games.'0 9 The "home county" in which the casino was located was receiving ten
percent of the casino's adjusted gross receipts tax collections." 0 These funds were
being used to "promote the safety of the public visiting the gambling boats.""' The
remaining adjusted gross receipts tax collections were being placed in a treasury
fund to benefit Missouri public education.' 2 About $136 million per year in gaming
taxes was going directly to fund Missouri public schools; $53
million per year was
13
going to cities and counties where the casinos are located.
As demonstrated by the existence of forces as diverse as education and due
process, the complexities of riverboat gambling and its effects are not easily
organized; such riverboat gaming projects are interdisciplinary matters that touch on
many areas of the law, including real estate finance, municipal law, environmental
law, federal administrative law, and taxation. "4 Such a web of conflicts may seem
out of the range of dispute resolution. The potential for increased jobs, educational
funds, tourism, and a unique form of entertainment indicates that some compromises
needed to be reached." 5 Obviously, the structure and bureaucracy of the courts had
been unsuccessful in reaching an effective compromise; this issue had been in front

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Young, supra note 7, at Al. The Commission staff had found that six of the state's eleven casino
complexes violated the guidelines. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Murphy & Epps, supra note 3, at 16 (citing Mo. REV.STAT. § 313.822 (1994)).
110. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.822(l)(1) (1994)).
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Young, supra note 7, at Al.
114. Id.
115. See id.
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of the legislature and courts for the past seven years to no avail. The courts had done
little to resolve the quagmire; could dispute resolution have accomplished anything
more?
B. The Indian Gaming Reservation Act
One possibility is a look toward the federal government and federal courts on
application of dispute resolution tactics to the gambling issue. In 1988, Congress
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act'1 6 in an effort to facilitate agreements
between the gambling industry of Indian tribes and the corresponding state and local
laws. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) divides gaming into three
classes." 7 Class I gaming includes social gaming for minimal prizes and traditional
Indian gaming conducted at ceremonies or celebrations." 8 Class H gaming includes,
inter alia, bingo, lotto, pull tabs, punch boards, and tip jars. 9 Class III gaming
includes casino-type gambling, parimutuel horse and dog racing,
lotteries, and all
20
other forms of gaming that are not class I or class II gaming.
The IGRA gives the Indian tribes limited jurisdiction over their gaming
enterprises. For example, if any Indian tribe proposes to engage in a class III gaming
activity on Indian lands of the Indian tribe, the governing body of the Indian tribe
must submit an ordinance or resolution to the Chairman of Indian affairs.' 2 ' That
Indian tribe shall then request the State in which such lands are located to enter into
negotiationsfor the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the
conduct of gaming activities. 22 Upon receiving such a request, the state shall
negotiate with the Indian tribe in goodfaith to enter into such a compact. 23 Tribalstate compacts can include provisions regarding the application of criminal and civil
laws and regulations, allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the tribe
and state, taxation by the tribe, remedies for breach of contract, standards for the
operation and maintenance of gaming facilities including licensing,
and any other
24
subjects directly related to the operation of gaming activities.
The IGRA has been less than successful. One commentator has described the
' 25
act as a "political compromise that pleased neither the states nor the tribes."'
Generally, the Indian tribes have been overmatched by the States during the
negotiations, and these negotiations only happen if the state actually consents to
conducting negotiations. Courts have chipped away at the Indian tribes' bargaining
power little by little. A state is often not required to negotiate with respect to forms
of gaming it does not, at that present time, permit. 26 Moreover, in the event the state

116. 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721 (1988).
117. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1993).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(2)(A) (1988).
122. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Cheyenne RiverSioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 275-76 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (1988)).
125. Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 769,
770 (1995).
126. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 279.
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refuses to negotiate, the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of Ex Parte
Young 1 7 does not allow a suit against a state's governor to require compact
negotiations. 28
'
Most breakdowns in these IGRA negotiations involve the types of games that
will be permitted on the Indian reservations. 2 9 This has been referred to as the scope
of the gaming problem. 30 Federal legislation compelling negotiation has been
highly unsuccessful and has spawned a multitude of lawsuits crying bad faith on
behalf of the opposing party. The "scope of the [federal] gaming problem" to which
Professor Cox alluded is precisely the scope of the Missouri gaming problem;
disagreements on what games will be permitted and what games will be excluded.
This controversy is the nexus of the Missouri problem; whether games of chance
should be allowed on riverboat casinos. If federal legislation compelling negotiation
was highly unsuccessful, the odds are strong that negotiations on a state level would
be unsuccessful as well.
C. A Modest Proposal
Despite the years that have passed, the problems still exist. For the past six
years, the Missouri court system has been extremely unsuccessful in reaching a
compromise concerning the riverboat gambling issue. 3 ' Unfortunately, neither the
proponents nor the opponents of riverboat gambling were in any better a position
after Akin than they were in 1992. Parties have refused to compromise, preferring
instead to direct their cries toward the legal system. This has cost the Missouri
taxpayers an unknown, yet undoubtedly unconscionable, amount of money.
Moreover, the case is far from over. Opponents of the new Constitutional
Amendment insist that the state must prepare for the inevitable
crime, welfare, and
32
bankruptcies that the gambling industry will produce.
The gambling casino industry employs 7,200 individuals in the St. Louis
Metropolitan area alone.' 33 The gambling casino industry generates millions of
dollars for the Missouri educational system. 3 4 Conversely, many believe the
gambling casino industry breeds societal vices such as addiction and drug use.' 35
Yet, suspect strategies to facilitate the demise of riverboat gambling, such as
stressing collateral, yea, irrelevant, issues like the difference between a "moat" and
a "river" merely increase tension and disagreement. Moreover, such backdoor
tactics have wasted thousands of dollars of taxpayer money. Maybe educated
discussion between all of the interested parties, without being unnecessarily bogged

127. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Exparte Young doctrine allows a suit to be brought against a state
officer in lieu of the Eleventh Amendment restrictions. WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN T. VARAT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 76 (10th ed. 1997).
128. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
129. Cox, supra note 125, at 782.
130. Id. at 782-83.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 35-66.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
133. Fred Faust, School Won 't Let Mom Talk About Her CasinoJob, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb.
1, 1998, at A .
134. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
135. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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down in the structure and formality of the court system, would lead to a more
cohesive and agreeable solution. Perhaps some form of mediation or arbitration
would have presented more creative solutions. This quagmire is not a classic
adversarial challenge of those morally opposed to gambling against those who enjoy
such entertainment. Other interests abound; other interested parties include the
educational system, the casino workers and employees of Missouri, churches and
religious groups, and the Missouri department of tourism. Traditional legal action
had been wholly ineffective; perhaps some honest dialogue and compromise was all
that was needed.
Some of the advantages of arbitration, in particular, cut directly toward the
center of the riverboat gambling quagmire. One benefit is that arbitration can be
initiated without long delays, the procedure is relatively short, and a decision can be
reached promptly.136 This would have eased tension and facilitated the process for
casinos whose licenses were up for renewal or casinos whose business lifeblood was
in danger. Also, in arbitration, the parties may have selected the applicable norms,
i.e. specifying the particular body of law that would serve as the basis for a decision
that might not be relevant in a court setting.'37 This would have eliminated the
intrusion of collateral, ancillary issues that tend to obfuscate the real issue. A perfect
example of an ancillary issue is the technical definition of a river. What was really
at issue was whether gambling should have been made legal; any deviations from the
real premise were simply a waste of taxpayer money and time. Finally, in
arbitration, the resolution can be tailored to the circumstances. 3 8 As previously
mentioned, this would remove the complex issue from the straightjacket of
traditional legal process and enable a more flexible, workable solution to be crafted.

VI. CONCLUSION
In effect, the state of Missouri is still embroiled in a complex legal and societal
disaster. The issue of legalizing riverboat gambling has been of primary importance
for the past six years. Unfortunately, as procured in the recent case of Akin v.
Missouri Gaming Commission, the problem is not going away anytime soon.
However, it would appear that both adversaries have exhausted not only their war
chests and legal stratagems, but also taxpayer dollars. There has been no lone victor
in this saga. Notwithstanding the lack of success of compelled arbitration between
state and casino operator on a federal level, some other method of agreement should
have been sought in the gaming situation. Maybe some form of multiple party
arbitration and/or honest discussion would have denoted at least a starting point for
a more constructive finish to this embittered controversy.
MATTHEW POTTER

136. LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 197 (1988).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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